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Chapter 4 - Producing in the United States: Beyond War Economy 
 
At this writing more than 800 American firms have transferred parts of their production 
operations to low wage countries, especially China and Mexico. Business Week of May 24, 
2004 reports that “Some 3 million factory jobs—one in every six—have been lost since the 
last peak in mid-2000.” The characteristic explanation that managers have offered for these 
moves is that only by discarding the high wage labor force of the U.S. will they be 
sufficiently profitable to be assured of ability to continue as managers of industrial 
enterprise.  
The immediate effect of these moves is the creation of a mass of unemployed American 
workers and the transformation of many communities into “ghost towns”. Is all this 
inevitable? Is it true that industrial production of consumer goods and machines—including 
capital goods—is no longer feasible in the U.S., paying U.S. wages? 
 
Must U.S. Firms Move Manufacturing Outside the United States in Order to 
Compete? 
What factors can make U.S. based producers cost competitive vs. production “offshore”? 
Such questions typically raise another issue: can U.S. productivity offset Chinese wages? 
However, by examining the cost structure we find that a great portion of the costs borne by 
U.S. industrial firms are incurred outside the realm of production in the form of salaries to 
administrative workers. In 1996 within U.S. manufacturing firms, for every hundred 
production workers there were 53 salaried, administrative (and technical) employees. This 
Administrative : Production ratio as measured here in terms of people is also reflected in 
terms of cost. By 1996, for every dollar paid to production workers an equal sum was paid to 
the salaried employees. This equality of payments tells you immediately that the conventional 
method of slashing the costs of industrial products by lowering production worker wages is 
not the only option available. However, in most U.S. manufacturing firms the idea of 
reducing the salaries of administrative employees is almost unheard of.* (Recall that Chapter 
3 shows U.S. corporate chiefs being paid 531 times the employee average.)  
Apart from administrative costs and materials, the main body of expense in 
manufacturing production is controlled by the productivity of labor and the productivity of 
capital. The degree of mechanization of work has a controlling effect on the average output 
per production worker, (i.e. the productivity of labor). But for every work task there are 
alternative production methods and equipments that can be graded on the basis of intensity 
of mechanization – in essence, the size of the capital outlay per particular piece of 
equipment.  
In the centuries-long history of manufacturing industry, managers and their engineers 
have responded to the rising wages of production workers by developing means of 
production by which the average output per production worker man-hour could be 
progressively increased. At any given time and for any given task, a manufacturer confronts 
an array of possible production equipments ranked in terms of the capital outlay required for 
each one: the higher the wages of production workers, the greater the capital outlay that can 
                                                
* For the long-term record of administrative overhead in U.S. firms see: S. Melman, “The Rise of 
Administrative Overhead in the Manufacturing Industries of the United States, 1899-1947”, Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. III, No.1, January 1951; also for the more recent record see S. 
Melman, After Capitalism, Op. Cit. pp. 178,179. 
be justified in order to increase the output per production worker man-hour. This is called 
the alternative cost of labor to machinery.  
In the United States the average “Hourly Compensation Cost”1 of a production worker 
man-hour to management was $21.33 by 2002. Therefore any management seeking to 
minimize the cost of output per production worker was justified in making a larger capital 
investment per production worker man-hour in the U.S. as compared to the design of 
production methods where the “Hourly Compensation Cost” is much lower – e.g. Mexico 
$2.38. 
For example, the Pioneer Corporation of Japan has invested in new manufacturing 
facilities in China and we learn that “Pioneer is hiring workers by the hundreds to fill jobs on 
the line that pay about $95 a month, above average for the region.” Assuming 170 hours per 
month (a 40 hour week), the China wage would be about $0.56 per hour. Compare that with 
the cost to management of a production worker man-hour in Japan. By 2002 it averaged 
$18.83 per hour, 33 times as much as the Chinese wage. Accordingly, it is no surprise at all 
that “in China, paying workers … to do rote tasks like hunching over tiny chip assemblies 
and affixing pinhead-size pieces is cheaper than installing the industrial robots that would 
typically be used to do the same work in Japan.”2 
This is a clear demonstration of the role of alternative costs of labor to machinery, and 
their effect on production methods and productivity. The same considerations apply, of 
course, to American firms making investments in China. American firms are making the 
same calculation.  
 
CONSUMER GOODS: MAKING SHOES IN THE US: NEW BALANCE 
RUNS THE PRODUCTIVITY RACE 
This is a demonstration of what is feasible when technology is developed to respond to 
alternative cost of labor to machinery so as to make possible economic production, and then 
some, in the United States. Here are crucial parts of the story of New Balance Athletic 
Shoes. Stroll through New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc.’s factory in Norridgewock, Me., and 
you will see workers using high-tech skills to make a low-tech product. Well-trained, $14-an-
hour employees work in small teams, perform a half-dozen jobs, and switch tasks every few 
minutes. Some operate computerized equipment with up to 20 sewing-machine heads 
running at once. Others control an automated stitcher guided by cameras, which allows one 
operator to do the work of six using ordinary sewing machines. 
Now, visit a Chinese subcontractor’s factory that makes the same shoe for New Balance. 
You might think you had traveled back in time 100 years. In the factories that manufacture 
shoes for New Balance, Nike, Reebok International, and other U.S.-based athletic-footwear 
companies, hundreds of women hunch over sewing machines much like ones used in their 
grandmothers’ time. The story is the same across China and in Indonesia and Vietnam. 
Young women in their teens or early 20s, with little education and few skills, put in long 
hours six days a week, usually performing the same task in mind-numbing repetition for 20 
cents to 40 cents an hour. 
… Over the past five years, New Balance has doubled its U.S. workforce, to 1,200, and 
opened a fifth U.S. factory. But back in the mid-1990s, sales exploded--from about $300 
million to $1.1 billion today. The company couldn’t ramp up U.S. production fast enough to 
keep pace, so it turned to subcontractors to fill the gap. The share of its shoes produced at 
home fell to 25%, with the rest coming from Asia. Over time, [owner, Jim] Davis says, he 
aims to get back to the 70% production New Balance maintained in the U.S. five years ago. 
How can New Balance make shoes at home when Nike, Reebok, and the rest can’t? 
Mainly by adopting the latest manufacturing techniques used by U.S. companies in higher-
skilled industries. Employees start with 22 hours of classroom instruction on teamwork and other 
techniques and get constant training on the factory floor. They work in teams of five or six, sharing tasks 
and picking up the slack for one another to make sure they get everything done. [emphasis added] 
… The combination of teams and technology has slashed the cost disadvantage of producing in 
the U.S. New Balance’s U.S. workers turn out a pair of shoes in just 24 minutes, vs. about 
three hours in the Asian factories that make the same product, says Herb Spivak, New 
Balance’s head of operations. If the U.S. workers were no more efficient than those in 
China, New Balance’s labor costs in the U.S., where it pays $14 an hour in wages and 
benefits, would be an untenable $44 per pair of shoes. But the company has whittled the 
cost down to $4 a pair vs. $1.30 in China, where labor costs are about 40 cents an hour. “[In 
Asia,] their labor is so inexpensive that they can waste it,” says Spivak. “Ours is so dear that 
we come up with techniques to be very efficient.” [emphasis added] 
Davis says New Balance can remain competitive under these circumstances. The 
remaining $2.70 labor cost differential is a manageable 4% of a typical $70 shoe. And it’s 
offset by the advantages of producing in the U.S., says Davis, where he can fill store orders 
faster than rivals and whip out style changes more quickly.3 A 2003 report on New Balance 
brings us up to date on that firms wage and production development.  
 
Starting wage is $15 per hour including benefits -- a fair wage in the belt of 
economically depressed towns along the Merrimack River, such as 
Lawrence and Haverhill where many of the workers live. 
To offset labor costs many times higher than their overseas suppliers, New 
Balance pushes efficiency in materials. The company has a 95 percent yield 
on materials, said Vachon, recalling in his early career when 70 percent was 
considered efficient. A 530-sq.-ft. piece, for example, can yield 216 pairs of 
women’s shoes cut in roughly two hours. The factory uses four basic 
patterns, but can make 13 different men’s and women’s styles from those 
standards.4 … 
… Bucking the trend toward moving, [out of the U.S.] New Balance has 
actually expanded its U.S. manufacturing base, and expects to grow it by 
another 10 percent in 2003…. 
“I can’t see [shifting all production overseas], to be quite honest,” said Jim 
Tompkins, president and COO of New Balance, which produces 
approximately 25 percent of its products in five factories throughout 
Maine and Massachusetts. “We are privately held and that is a statement 
we want to make,” he said. “There is no one to tell us otherwise.” 
According to Tompkins, New Balance’s U.S. factories allow the company 
to deliver product more quickly domestically, and also give it the 
opportunity to monitor a shoe’s development more closely. “There’s 
nothing more interesting and fun than developing a product, then walking 
down the hall six months later and seeing it,” he said.5 
 
This new production system instituted by New Balance is a demonstration of classic, 
innovative development of manufacturing methods. Every main aspect of operations was 
addressed: economy in use of raw materials; major innovation in production machines; 
training production workers; reducing variability in timing of production operations; 
reducing scrap rates; and reducing frequency of unscheduled down-time. 
This New-Balance agenda of changes in production methods contrasts with the more 
frequent employer focus on worker wages and union demands which so many employers 
strive to escape by “going offshore”.  
 
CAPITAL GOODS: CAN U.S. FIRMS PRODUCE THE CAPITAL GOODS 
NEEDED FOR U.S. INFRASTRUCTURE RENEWAL? 
 
MACHINE TOOLS—MADE IN CALIFORNIA  
Haas Automation is a designer and manufacturer of Computer Numerically Controlled, 
(CNC) machine tools, including machining and turning centers and controls. (The Haas web 
site is at www.haascnc.com and includes rich detail not only on products and facilities, but 
also on the organization of work.)  
Haas Automation is privately held and therefore has no published record of profit and 
loss and related data. The firm began operations in 1983 and at this writing has 750 
employees, of whom nearly 200 are engineers. The offices and production facilities of Haas 
are located in Oxnard, CA.  
Haas manufactures both the computer numerical controls (CNC) and the associated 
machine tools. Other firms that are principal producers of CNC controls for machine tools 
include Siemens, Fanuc, and Heidenhain (in Germany and Japan). In 2003 Haas Automation 
produced between 318-472 machines per month, with an average of 366 machines per 
month. This number of produced machine tools is built on the basis of a schedule. They are 
not individually built “to order”. Characteristically, the firm retains a one-month stock of 
machines as a continuing inventory.  
Haas Automation strives to operate its production facilities on a three-shift basis: one shift 
manned and two shifts unmanned. Unmanned means that production operations are programmed 
and regulated by the CNC devices that can be set to regulate the performance of single 
machining centers or turning centers, as well as the transfer of work-pieces mounted on 
pallets among machine tools.  
Haas makes extensive use of flexible manufacturing systems, robotic loaders, “just-in-
time” production methods and lean manufacturing practices. Machine tools are linked to and 
controlled by the company’s ERP system, (enterprise resource planning – software that 
integrates many functions of an enterprise) which is also tied into the production schedule 
and inventory control. 
Essentially, Haas operates a “machinery inventory bank” following the pattern of such an 
inventory system proposed in 1959 in discussions at Columbia University on the machine 
tool industry.* 
Haas Automation places considerable importance on the idea of designing its machines 
and controls on the basis of “modules”. Thus the 59 horizontal and vertical machining 
centers identified in the Haas Model Guide all use many comparable modules including, for 
example, the tool changers. There is also commonality in many of the base castings used on 
the machining centers, and in the many components that appear frequently in machine tools 
– like linear guides, ball screws, and a variety of pumps.  
                                                
* Those discussions focused on the problem of how to operate a stable production system for a 
machine tool industry instead of the established pattern of “boom and bust”. 
Haas Automation makes its own gears, having decided some time ago that they could 
manufacture a better quality set of gear products with the gear making under their own 
supervision. Whereupon they purchased the requisite array of gear making machines, and 
operate them continuously.  
The market for Haas machines and controls has been mainly among job shops. During 
the last five years however, they have been successful in entering the market of “second-tier” 
customers, like the manufacturing facilities of automobile firms. This extended interest in 
CNC machine tools on the part of the automobile manufacturing fraternity stems from an 
increasing interest in flexibility for product design. A commitment to using the more 
traditional “transfer-type” machines for fabricating automobile parts has had the automatic 
effect of committing the firm so invested to long-term production for a particular class of 
products. In contrast, the machining centers permit rapid change in product design while still 
retaining many features of machine control and transferring work in process among 
machining locations. This kind of versatility is facilitated by the use of pallet changer devices 
that hold and transfer products from one machine tool to another. (Haas includes 
appropriate types of pallets in its product line.)  
Palletization of workpieces, sometimes with accompanying vehicles for pallet transfer 
among machines, may well be a growing option whose effects clearly will include facilitating 
mechanization of product movement among machining centers. Notably, some production 
designs use robots for inter-machine product transfer. Options for these purposes include 
setting up multiple machining centers in “cellular” units with palletized handling of 
workpieces.  
Of course, it is still the case that in the job shop class of CNC machine tool operations, 
“hand” movement of workpieces among machines remains the customary method.  
Haas management views the company as a producer of quality, affordable machines. With 
this understanding, new technology is implemented in ways that have a far-reaching effect 
across an array of machine tool types and therefore user industries. Accordingly, Haas is not a 
“cutting edge” company. It does not operate a separately designated research team for 
machine tool design. Instead, Haas relies on a stream of technological modifications that can 
improve the characteristics of entire classes of the Haas product line. The engineering staff 
of nearly 200, includes electrical, mechanical and “manufacturing” engineers whose 
combined skills contribute to modifications in product design and manufacturing methods.  
To my knowledge, Haas Automation is the only manufacturer of machine tools to 
publish prices for its principal products in public view. Prices for Haas’s products are 
available on their web site: www.haascnc.com. Haas regards the publication of prices and the 
consequent curtailment of bargaining opportunities as a positive characteristic for the 
continued operation and future of the firm.  
These details on Haas Automation are included because they demonstrate the feasibility 
of producing technically sophisticated capital goods in the United States and marketing them 
in the U.S., Europe and Asia. Note that there is a Haas marketing office and staff in 
Shanghai. 
Haas Automation currently (Fall-Winter, 2003) regards the West European and the China 
market as important opportunities and challenges. In the case of China, the Haas 
management is aware of finance problems associated with the dollar-Yuan exchange value 
problem. With respect to China they also see it as an important positive factor that their 
machines are designed with a modular concept. It is expected that that will help in reaching 
Chinese markets because then there is greater interchangeability, readier replacement of 
components etc. For example: the modular design principle facilitates “servicing” capability 
for Haas products; the circuit boards on the computer numerical controls are to a large 
degree interchangeable.  
Haas is heavily involved in education programs throughout the U.S. and has established 
nearly 60 Haas Technical Education Centers at learning institutions around the country. One 
of these, the Factory for Advanced Manufacturing Education was established at Penn State 
University in 2000. With 10 Haas machining and turning centers and an associated portable 
“multimedia-broadcasting cart”, demonstrations of sophisticated machine tool operations 
can be brought into classrooms and auditoriums to facilitate discussion and training in Penn 
State’s industrial and manufacturing engineering programs. There are also Haas machines 
used at hundreds of other centers in high schools, community colleges, technical colleges, 
and universities nationwide. Thereby Haas managers generate a body of professionals trained 
in Haas CNC and machining technologies.  
The firm is also noteworthy for the fact that it has no debt, is not obligated to banks for 
funding and is in the enviable position of striving to build market share. It has a position of 
strength for purposes of reaching diverse markets. Accordingly, the management of Haas 
sees itself as a target firm for many competitors, even as it has been striving to build market 
share.  
To illuminate the further meaning of the Haas operation a comparison is made between 
approximately comparable machining centers offered by Haas and by an important 
competing firm, Mazak.* As you can see from the basic dimensions and characteristics 
identified here, these are machines with comparable capabilities. The Haas $17,000 price 
advantage is substantial and probably derives from unusually close attention to economies 
due to the organization of work at Haas Automation.  
 
Model Mazak Nexus 410 A Haas VF-2SS 
Horsepower 25 HP 30 HP (Peak) 
Number of tools 32 25 
Tool change time 2.9 seconds 1.5 seconds 
RPM 12,000 rpm 12,000 rpm 
Rapid rate 
movement 
1,471 inches / minute 1,400 inches / 
minute 
X, Y, Z, travel 22” x 16” x 20” 30” x 16” x 20” 
Price $73,900 $56,900 
 
 
 
COMPONENTS OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION – CAPITAL GOODS 
In order to repair each category of infrastructure it is necessary to have the use of a set of 
specialized devices. This equipment, in turn is produced in factories that utilize machine 
tools to fabricate their component parts. These machine tools are the core capital goods, for 
                                                
* Note: Mazak is a highly respected, innovative manufacturer of machine tools. The parent company, 
Yamazaki Mazak Corporation is headquartered in Nagoya, Japan with 4,000 employees worldwide, 
and branches in 15 countries, including production and servicing facilities in the United States. The 
Mazak website is at: www.mazak.co.jp 
they are used to fabricate many types of useful equipments—as required for making railcars, 
wastewater treatment plants, earth moving machines, energy producing equipment, etc.  
This connection between capital goods and specialized machines that are used to make 
every element of infrastructure is a vital link that helps to define the need for renewal of the 
means of production throughout the industrial system if the U.S. is to graduate from the 
present quagmire. 
The most generalized formulation of the nature of capital goods is the following 
abstracted from the work of Dr. Jon Rynn. 
 
Production required by a community takes place in a sequence of stages. 
The stage of production that is the focus of economics is final production. In 
the final production stage, factories use production machinery to create 
consumer goods. …  
But how were the machines and buildings that constitute the factories 
created? Machine tools – are the primary equipment. First, they can 
produce more of their own kind.  
Machine tools also make production machinery; and production machinery is then 
used to create final goods and services.  
 
What are the major planning methods that would be required to execute this Infrastructure 
program? There are formal methods for making detailed assessments so that one could 
know what outputs from particular industries are required for actually executing a 
production program that is defined by the Report Card on Infrastructure proposal. The 
methodology for that sort of operation is available in the form of the “input-output analysis” 
that is performed following the methodology once developed by Wassily Leontief.6  
Four classes of products will have strategic importance as required basic inputs for a 
serious effort to carry forward the Report Card recommendations: steel, electricity, machine 
tools and computers.  
Owing to the thoughtful work of Dr. Jon Rynn we have a helpful formulation of the role 
of such “capital” goods.*  
 
THE ROLE OF CAPITAL GOODS IN PRODUCTION  
 
Beyond machine tools there are several other strategically important technologies of 
production. Since the end of the nineteenth century, steel-making has been critical for the 
production of machines. Steel-making equipment is therefore used to make the steel for 
production machinery, machine tools, and for more steel-making machinery. Also, since the turn 
of the last century, electricity generation has been the most important form of energy 
conversion within the production process, allowing for the development of motors (most 
critically, in machine tools), the use of electric lances in steel-making, and most famously, the 
development of electronic machinery.  
                                                
* From a paper by Jon Rynn to the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. He formulated a pattern for appreciating the functional role of “capital” goods in a 
larger production system. 
 
Computers, the most important form of electronic equipment, are dependent, since the 
introduction of integrated circuits in the 1960s, on a form of equipment called 
semiconductor-making equipment. All of these forms of machinery possess these crucial 
qualities: first, they are used to make more of themselves; second, they are used to make 
more of other forms of production machinery; and third, technological advances in one form of 
production machinery accelerates technological development in other forms of machinery (and 
other sectors of the production system as well). 
The history of technology is replete with the positive feedback effects of change in one 
class of machines affecting change in a large set of different machines. The most critical type 
of semiconductor-making equipment is optical lithography equipment. Advances in this kind 
of machine allow for denser and denser central processing units. … Advances in computers 
led to advances in machine tool design, in particular, numerically and then computer-
controlled machine tools. Better machine tools then led to better precision glass cutting, 
among other things, which led to better optical lithography equipment.  
Better computers led to more automated, highly-efficient steel factories; better kinds of 
steel led to better machine tools … Better machine tools made mass production possible, 
because mass production is dependent on the ability to produce interchangeable parts, which 
can then be assembled in a final product using an assembly line, as opposed to custom-
fitting each component to a particular car or machine. The declining cost of electricity-
generation, itself a by-product of advances in machine tools, steel-making, and information-
processing, led to better and cheaper machines and goods.7 As suggested by these 
formulations of “capital” goods, consider the recent quality of U.S. production of three 
classes of capital goods: electricity; machine tools; steel.  
 
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATING MACHINERY 
Unintended, the August 14, 2003 breakdown of electricity supply in Canada, the US Midwest 
and New England was a solid demonstration of the “capital goods” role of electricity. Vital 
manufacturing industries in all these areas were stopped, as were uncountable arrays of 
consumer activities. Unintended too was the unplanned test of the idea that production has 
become “old hat”, now succeeded by a “service economy”.  
Soon after August 14, 2003, a federal government report was issued that included an 
assessment of basic failures in capital goods operation that led to this breakdown in 
electricity supply. Several industry reports addressing this breakdown identified a set of 
interlocking failures that contributed to the calamitous loss of power. The findings included 
the following. 
 
• In one Ohio power company “workers could not act to halt an escalating crisis 
because they did not even know it existed”;8 
• “The blackout could have been safely contained if not for the utility’s 
malfunctioning computers and inadequately trained control workers”;9 
• There was a “failure by First Energy to do the most basic maintenance of the 
company’s transmission lines – namely the trimming of trees underneath and 
alongside the lines.”10 A variety of experts now say the findings were too narrow, 
ignoring the federal government’s role in the recent reshaping of the power 
industry;11 
• “Maybe the report doesn’t go there because the answer is not one that is 
comfortable politically”, said Alan H. Richardson, the president of the American 
Public Power Association;12 
• “FirstEnergy was hobbled by the failure of a computer program that was supposed 
to set off alarms in the company’s main control room when power lines failed or 
were stressed beyond their limits. That, in turn, caused the computer system itself to 
fail, and then a backup system, as well. It meant that operators in the control room 
were getting delayed, incomplete information about the failures of transmission lines 
and power plants in their region.”;13 
 
Commenting on the Report of the U.S.-Canada Power Systems Outage Task Force, John A 
Cosazza (a retired executive with Public Service Electric and Gas of New Jersey, stated: “The root 
causes that they name are not really the root causes. The root causes are that deregulation 
had ‘provided the incentive to maximize profits now rather than provide long range service,’ 
and basic maintenance like tree trimming.”14 
The report of the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force triggered a set of assessments 
that indicated a need for fundamental power system change. Thus “Much of the broad 
picture the report paints of Aug. 14 (2003) -- the malfunctioning computer systems, the lack 
of information, the sequence of failures -- has been known for months. But the details 
released today lay out previously unknown layers of dysfunction, presenting the hours 
leading up to the blackout as almost a comedy of errors among the people who were 
supposed to know and control what was happening to that section of the power grid.”15 
The federal government and its military-serving agencies have played a dominant part in 
enlarging funds for research and for graduate-student support, and in opening up new job 
opportunities for young engineers and scientists. One of the main effects of these initiatives 
following World War II was to induce the deans and faculties of American engineering 
schools to revise their curricula and research orientations to emphasize knowledge and 
training for servicing the expanding requirement of the military economy. Owing to the new 
emphasis on where the action was (money, jobs), there was a relative de-emphasis of 
manpower, attention and money in the universities and technical schools from training their 
students for civilian-industry technologies. Curricula and technical research in classic fields 
of civilian-engineering responsibility, like power engineering, were accorded lesser priorities.* 
16  
 
MACHINE TOOLS 
The shortcomings of the U.S. machine tool industry, partly reported in chapter 3 deserve 
further detailing. As far back as the 1960’s graduate students in the Department of Industrial 
Engineering / Operations Research at Columbia University were writing papers that defined 
preferred practices for a U.S. machine tool industry. The recommendations were aimed at 
inducing greater productivity in the industry that supplied the machines that are used to 
produce all other machines. Nevertheless, decay in the industry has proceeded so that by 
                                                
* I recall the comment of a senior electronics engineer, saying that during the 1950s and 1960s those 
who went into power engineering were “the dregs” of the profession. With this “I’m all right, Jack” 
outlook, this man’s main concern was to justify the priority accorded his brand of work, and never 
mind these awkward problems about energy supply and utilization. By implication such topics can be 
left to “the dregs.” 
 
2003 two thirds and more of the supply of machine tools to American firms is dependent on 
imports, mainly from Japan and Germany.  
The following practices were identified in the Columbia 1960 studies as important for 
optimizing the performance of the machine tool industry.  
 
Modular design. This means fashioning a set of components that could have a place in 
diverse machine tools, thereby encouraging economics of quantity in producing sections of 
these machines. 
Production equipment. The American machine tool industry has been undercutting itself 
by its failure to make use of the most productive machine tools that it produces for the 
manufacture of new machine tools.  
Standardization. Formulating and applying a set of standards for machine tool components 
would produce substantial economies and improvements in reliability. But the machine tool 
industry associations declined to apply themselves to this task.  
Numerical control systems. Even during the earliest period of introduction of CNC 
(Computer Numerical Control) it was clear that substantial advantages were to be scored if 
the design of the controls was carried forward in connection with the design of the 
machinery elements they were charged with controlling. The principal U.S. firms ignored this 
possible advantage. 
Market fluctuation. The managers in the machine tool industry viewed themselves as 
unavoidably functioning within a framework of market forces that left them unable to 
forecast market demand. In fact, proposals were formulated, but never discussed by industry 
managers, for establishing a Machinery Inventory Bank, a financing institution designed to 
stabilize sales and production.  
Stable production system. Managers in this industry gave little attention to the 
consequences of production operations at a “stable” rate. Evidence from diverse sources has 
demonstrated that stabilizing production operations yielded: reduction in unscheduled 
downtime; reduction in scrap rates; an increased percent of product falling within desired 
dimensions, and other specifications; enabling smaller inventories of work in process and 
major reduction in inventories of raw materials and components; all these in combination 
yielding increased productivity of the capital goods producing factories. 
 
These desirable characteristics for optimizing productivity in the actual production of 
machine tools have been mainly absent from the factories of the U.S. machine tool industry. 
By 2003 however, the performance of U.S. machine tool builder, Haas Automation, Inc, 
included many characteristics like the ones identified above. They have been accompanied by 
substantial gains in terms of productivity of capital and labor, and competitive product 
pricing (discussed below).  
 
MAKING STEEL 
Steel continues to be the single most important material of choice for an enormous array of 
consumer goods and capital goods. The various structural and managerial limitations in the 
operation of American steel making firms have been discussed elsewhere.* These have 
included dismaying inattention to R&D for new production methods, especially among the 
older, larger steel industry firms. Nevertheless, two major factors have appeared in the 21st 
century that offer a fresh opportunity for American steel makers: a historically 
                                                
* S. Melman, Profits Without Production, (Alfred A. Knopf, NY 1988), pp. 188-199. 
unprecedented expansion in steel consumption worldwide, and concomitant market demand 
for steel; second, the development within the American steel industry of “mini-mills” whose 
major raw material is the scrap metal from discarded metal products. Mini-mill operating 
methods include sophisticated techniques for continuous casting that bypass major 
traditional investments in rolling mills. 
As to the first factor, increased steel consumption. For the first time in many years there 
is a global steel shortage, largely driven by the rapid and massive growth in Chinese demand 
for every sort of raw material used in steel manufacture. Locker Associates, a New York firm 
that monitors the steel industry, reports that the addition to China’s steel capacity during the 
last ten years is greater than the entire capacity of the U.S. steel industry. Locker Associates 
report that in the spring of 2003 “when Chinese demand was particularly feverish, even U.S. 
producers were exporting to the mainland, and China essentially absorbed the world’s excess 
steel production …”  
All told, these market conditions have given the U.S. steel industry a new opportunity for 
internal renewal. This opens up fresh perspectives for technological advance and for 
stabilized employment in the U.S. steel industry.  
Nevertheless, American conventional wisdom continues to hold that manufacturing in 
the United States cannot possibly produce goods to compete against the products of 
Chinese and the exploited battalions of workers in other poor countries. Workers in such 
countries may be paid $72 / month to work 12 hour shifts, six or seven days a week.  
 
 
HOW JAPAN’S FIRMS COPE WITH WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
From agile reporters at The Wall Street Journal, we have up-to-date reports on how several 
major Japan-based firms—Matsushita and Hitachi—have been sustaining production in 
Japan where industrial workers’ “Hourly Compensation Cost” (2002) is $18.83 per hour. 
They do this while carrying out parts of their firms’ production in China paying Chinese 
workers about $.56 per hour. 17 “Big manufacturers such as Hitachi Construction and 
consumer-electronics giant Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. have boosted efficiency and 
can now make highly complex goods as cheaply in Japan as they can overseas.” During the 
1990’s Japan experienced a similar situation as the U.S., losing manufacturing jobs to 
locations in China. Recently however, the Japanese manufacturing sector has been bolstered 
due to higher demand in China for Japanese products—including the machinery needed to 
produce various consumer goods.  
Panasonic Factory Solutions, a branch of Matsushita, … is one of the world’s biggest 
makers of insertion machines -- highly sophisticated industrial robots that stick tiny 
semiconductors and other components onto green circuit boards. The boards form the guts 
of electronic products which are being churned out in increasing volumes in China. The 
company’s machines contain up to 30,000 separate parts. The most popular model can 
punch 16 chips per second onto a circuit board, with a precision of five-hundredths of a 
millimeter -- about the width of a few grains of pollen. Panasonic Factory Solutions’ big-
ticket machines see sales of only about 50 units each month. … it’s more cost-effective to 
keep production in Japan, close by the company’s suppliers and research centers.  
Japanese manufacturers of construction and mining equipment have also benefited from 
the boom in China. The largest pieces of equipment are even imported into China 
completed, instead of using Chinese labor for assembly. Hitachi Construction is fielding 
increasing orders for ultralarge power shovels -- behemoths as big as a house that manipulate 
truck-size scoops in strip mines. Instead of making these monster shovels overseas, Hitachi 
Construction in September plans to expand production by renting a nearby factory. By 
contrast, midsize power shovels for building sites are mass-produced and they are generally 
put together in local markets. Of the nearly 3,000 that Hitachi Construction sold in China 
over the past six months, 2,200 were assembled in a factory in China’s inland city of Hefei. 
But some 43% of the value of a made-in-China shovel comes from Japan. … revenue 
jumped 25% in the year ended March 31. Hitachi Construction says it plans always to 
produce key components in Japan: the engine, computer controllers and the hydraulic valve. 
Concentrating production in one place saves on plant investment. It also leads to better 
machines. Japanese factories will also continue to produce components for consumer goods 
whose production is difficult and requires greater sophistication. Although simple circuit 
boards for cellphones are being made in China, multilayer boards for more advanced 
handsets are produced in Japan -- and are seeing sales rise, … Digital-camera components, 
now mostly manufactured in Japan, will soon be produced in China as well. But Matsushita 
is likely to keep in Japan the production of hard-to-make key parts that are constantly 
upgraded, such as semiconductors and lenses. Japan’s manufacturing expertise is having clear 
economic impacts. While the U.S. trade deficit with China surged 20% to $124 billion in 
2003, Japan’s deficit with China shrank 24% to the equivalent of $19 billion. This February 
[2004], Japan ran a monthly trade surplus with China for the first time in 10 years. Exports 
of Japanese machinery and electronic gadgets … are among the biggest drivers of Japan’s 
recent expansion.  
If production competence of American manufacturing is to be restored, two major 
requirements must be met. First, a large population of engineers and blue-collar workers 
must become convinced that there are alternatives to every class of operation, and that ways 
for organizing work can make major differences with any given means of production. But 
more than that: a way is also needed to mobilize vast production talents and resources if the 
production competence of American industry is to be restored.  
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